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CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTIES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION
Frank E. Horack, Jr.
In time of war patriotic zeal frequently jeopardizes the liberties of
those who through individual judgment, conscience, or ignorance sup-
port unpopular opinions. Courts inevitably are the arbiters of the
resulting controversies; but their determinations are but a part of
the total governmental and social action involved. Thus, when social
stability is challenged all governmental action is tested by its ability
to maintain popular support for an unified and aggressive program.
Within the span of one generation, two foreign wars and an in-
ternal economic depression have measured the vitality of our form
of government. Without political disintegration, as in France, and
without political regimentation, as in the dictatorships, popular gov-
ernment has been maintained. This test of unity is gratifying; par-
ticularly where, as in our form of government, the powers- of govern-
ment are separate and independent. It is the best evidence that at
least on the fundamentals of government we have an unified society.
Unanimity of opinion, of course, has never been complete. But it is
reassuring that during the present war there has been less divergence
of view concerning our constitutional liberties than there has been
in many more peaceful times. With but few exceptions, public, opin-
ion, executive, legislative, and judicial action have reflected a firmly
settled judgment that even in war time individual liberty shall not be
impaired.
The judiciary and the law-enforcing agencies are more directly on
trial during these times than at any other. Charged with protecting
minorities from the over-reachings of the majority, judicial decisions
reflecting the majority's firm conviction in individual liberty must
frequently appear to be in direct defiance of the will of the majority
at a particular time and place. The success of the judiciary thus
becomes linked with the poise of the majority and the willingness of
public opinion to follow the dictates of judgment and abjure the
temptations of emotion.
I.
Public opinion afforded little support to the judiciary prior to and
during World War I. As a nation we were disunited, uncertain of
purpose and intolerant of national, racial, and group identities. Many
B. A., 1926, J. D., 1929, State Univ. of Iowa; LL. M., 1930, S. J. D., 1931,
Harvard. Editor: Casebook on Legislation, 1940; Professor of Law, Indiana Univ.
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were opposed to war. Some favored war but believed that we were
on the wrong side. Immigration was at its peak. Two states had just
entered the Union. We were still a young nation-sprawling over
a vast continent with inadequate channels of communication, we were
as unprepared emotionally as we were militarily for entrance into our
first major war.
In this setting, internal strife and controversy were inevitable. The
balance between majority and minority was too close; soon both sides
appealed to the courts for protection. The ensuing decisions in
Schenck v. United States,' Debs v. United States,2 Abrams v. United
States,' and Pierce v. United States4 marked out but scarcely resolved
the controversy. The issue presented by various settings of fact was
one of interpretation-of the ambit of the Espionage Act of 1917 and
of its relation to the First Amendment.
It is too inclusive to say that statutory construction is the art of
good judgment; but, indeed, this is much of it. It is equally clear
that good judgment is difficult in bad surroundings. And it is now
all too apparent that the best minds in World War I were required
to exist in the intellectual slums of the then dominant public opinion.
As Justice Brandeis pointed out, "The question in every case is
whether the words.., are used in such circumstances and are of such
a nature as to create a clear and present danger ... This is a rule of
reason. Correctly applied, it will preserve the right of free speech
both from suppression by tyrannous, well-meaning majorities, and
from abuse by irresponsible, fanatical minorities. Like many other
rules of human conduct, it can be applied correctly only by the exer-
cise of good judgment, and to the exercise of good judgment calmness
is, in times of deep feeling and on subjects which excite passion, as
essential as fearlessness and honesty." 5
That calmness did not exist is apparent from the manner of many
of the opinions. There was much haggling over "the facts" and their
proper "interpretation." Lesser attention was given the relation
between the federal statutes and the constitutional amendments.
Formal inquiry into the intent and purpose of the statutory and con-
stitutional enactments was given little attention. The stage was so
small that any action of the participants was dramatic.
Ironically for those of us who believe that the function of inter.
pretation is the discovery and application of legislative intention
1249 U.S. 47 (1919).
2 249 U. S. 211 (1919).
3 250 U. S. 616 (1919).
4 252 M S. 239 (1920).
5 See supra note 3 at p.
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and the respect of legislative policy, the one constructive principle
which emerged from the first World War litigation was the "clear
and present danger" rule advanced by Justice Holmes in the Schenck
case. It was the one exercise of "calmness" and "good judgment"
and yet it is difficult to believe that those who sponsored and sup-
ported the original legislation had eter intended such an interpreta-
tion. The practicality of advancing some rule of limitation, however
weak, when no other limitation was available speaks once again for
Holmes' genius. That such legislation might have been declared un-
constitutional during those times was probably both impossible and
undesirable."
II.
Between the two world wars the nation was growing together. The
automobile, the airplane, the motion picture, and the radio permitted
the many members of our family to keep in closer touch with one
another. Intellectually we were learning "that time has upset many
fighting faiths, . . . that the best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market." 7 The
work of Zechariah Chafee, the American Civil Liberties Union and
many liberal publications were of inestimable value in preventing the
recurrence of past mistakes.
The litigation of the period took many divergent paths (and some
were downward) s but for the most part progress from the dark days
of World War I was achieved. One new constitutional principle was
accepted during this period-the Supreme Court would refrain from
imposing its judgment upon state legislatures in matters of legislative
policy. Announced in litigation not involving direct questions of civil
liberties it came near to plunging the free speech question in wartime
back to its old unsavory status.
III.
The days immediately preceding our entrance into World War II
did not bode well for the cause of civil liberties. The Alien Regis-
tration Act which Professor Chafee promptly dubbed the "peace-time
sedition law" was passed. State legislatures enacted all manner of
restrictive legislation. Public and private committees hunted down
"un-American activity." In spite of this, most of the well-grounded
fears were never realized. Credit is due to many-the Attorney Gen-
0 We must remember that the minorities were "fanatical" just as the majority
was tyrannous. See supra note 5.
7 Ibid., note 6.
s See, Chafee, Free Speech in the United States, 357-384 (1941).
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eral, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, newspaper and radio com-
mentators, and to the Supreme Court for its impartial but prompt
action in Bx parte Quirin.9 A majority of the people were convinced
that the agencies of government were capable and prepared to handle
all questions of internal security. The administration of the Alien
Registration Act became a protection not only to our own security
but to hapless aliens who had no belligerent intentions.
The Supreme Court demonstrated in the Quirin case that traitor
and spy alike would receive all the constitutional safeguards for which
our form of government stands, but that there would be no shffly-
shallying with those caught red-handed. The American people could
be calm because there was no need to fear. These are non-legal facts
but they are important facts. They meant that law-enforcing agencies
could sift the seditious from the irresponsible because no need was
felt for vigilantes. Society would permit cases to be investigated by
proper authorities. This in turn relieved the judicial system of the
strain of many cases irresponsibly begun, but which having been in-
itiated inevitably become public issues.
Only against such a background can the free speech cases of World
War II be properly compared with those of World War I. It is a pic-
ture so clear that no student of the law can afford to overlook it in
surveying his obligations of participation in public affairs.
The issues of free speech in this period have centered around the
Jehovah's Witnesses cases. As usual the issues have not been single.
Not only freedom of speech, and of press, and of religion, but also of
patriotism, loyalty, state's rights and majority rule were wrapped
within the packet of briefs in those cases.10 Indeed in some it was
specifically asserted that the issue of free speech was not present at
all.1-
In one of the first cases, Minersville School District v. Gobitis,' 2
neither speech nor action but rather the lack of either was involved.
The children of a Witness had refused to give the flag salute in vio-
lation of a school board regulation treated by the court as directed
by the legislature of Pennsylvania.1 3 An injunction restraining the
members of the board and others from excluding the children from
school was reversed because,
"'Where all the effective means of inducing political changes
are left free from interference, education in the abandonment of
foolish legislation is itself a training in liberty. To fight out the
9 317 U. S. 1 (1942).
10 See Cantwell et al. v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940).
11. fid.
12 310 U. S. 586 (1940).
23 Supra note 12 at 597.
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wise use of legislative authority in the form of public opinion
and before legislative assemblies rather than to transfer such
a contest to the judicial area, servea to vindicate the self con-
fidence of a free people.' '14
Perhaps the Court was too concerned that it preserve its gains in
self-limitation established in the Kentucky Tax case to appreciate
the implications of its decisions, for at all events it remained for the
Chief Justice to warn in dissenting that
"The Constitution expresses more than the conviction of the
people that democratic processes must be preserved at all costs.
It is also an expression of faith and a command that freedom
of mind and spirit must be preserved, which government must
obey, if it is to adhere to that justice and moderation without
which no free government can exist.''15
Without now tracing the full course of this decision, it is well to
turn to its reversal in West Virginia State Board of Educatian v.
Barnette."" Here Justices Black and Douglas confess that
"Reluctance to make the Federal Constitution a rigid bar
against state regulation of conduct thought inimical to the
public welfare was the controlling influence which moved us to
consent to the Gobitis decision. Long reflection convinced us
that although the principle is sound, its application in the par-
ticular case was wrong.' ,17
And Mr. Justice Jackson found majority approval in his sterling
enunciation of principle, "that no official, high or petty, can prescribe
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other mat-
ters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein. 's
It was fortunate that Taylor v. Mississippi5 was decided the same
day. The court in the Barnette case having renounced its Gobitis de-
cision saw where that decision might have led if applied in the Taylor
case. Justice Roberts emphasized the oral statements and the litera-
ture disseminated by the defendants were not even claimed "to have
threatened any clear and present danger to our institutions or our
government.' 20 If clear and present danger were a valid standard
with which to measure words and action, certainly though the cases
might be raised by different procedures and under different statutes,
it was equally valid that the protection, to paraphrase Mr. Justice
'4 Supra note 12 at 600.
15 Supra note 12 at 606.
l 319 U. S. 624 (1943).
IT Supra note 16 at 643.
18 Supra note 16 at 642.
1o 319 U. S. 583 (1943).
20 Supra note 19 at 589.
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Murphy, be extended to the meek and the quiescent as well as to the
aggressive and the disputatious.21
There have been other Jehovah's Witness cases before the court
and cases raising other issues of constitutional liberty but the pattern
of decision in those discussed stands as a monument representing what
can be done in times of stress if men keep calm. It can hardly be
said that any of the decisions were dictated by statutory or constitu-
tional direction so clear that reasonable men might not have differed
as to their intent. It cannot be said that these decisions were guided
or misguided by any single standard or rule of constitutional inter-
pretation. It may safely be asserted that no rule of interpretation
could or did dictate a decision. It is inevitable that rules of constitu-
tional or statutory interpretation help in framing the issues and that
whether the opinions are written in the conventional language of in-
terpretation the issues of popular opinion which legislative intention
poses forever remain in the cases.
Contrasting the cases from the first World War with those from
the present conflict another datum is added to the proposition that
the court cannot escape the climate in which it lives. It indicates
further that the influence of that climate does not occur at the time
of the argument of the cases but depends upon the proper education
of the citizenry over long periods of time to the responsibility of free
government. This is a task for all of us, and if properly done we may
be confident with Thomas Jefferson that this is "the strongest gov-
ernment on earth" and therefore agree with him that
"If there be any among us who wish to dissolve this union,
or to change its republican form, let them stand undisturbed,
as monuments of the safety with which error of opinion may be
tolerated where reason is left free to combat it."
21 "The right extends to the aggressive and the disputatious as v-ell -s to the
meek and acquiescent." Murphy, J., concurring in Martin V. Sturthers, : 19 U. S.
141 at 149 (1943).
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